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COVID-19 is not only causing worldwide economic decline, 
it is also feeding the world-view of those who favor more 
isolationist policies. While de-globalization captures more 
than trade, economic integration is at its core. In this arti-
cle, the not-so-well-known operational underpinnings of 
trade globalization are explored. The basic reasons why 
international trade has skyrocketed in the recent past 
point to our economic future as well. 
The advantages of trade between nations has been known for 
several hundred years. Columbus made his voyage west from 
Spain in search of a new trade route, not adventure or con-
quest. Ricardo formulated the theory of “comparative ad-
vantage” in international trade in 1817.1 Unlike most of the 
20th century, we are currently in a globalization era. The per-
centage of world GDP involving foreign trade rose from only 
27% in 1970 to 59% in 2018. For the United States in particu-
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
There have always been 
advantages to international 
trade, but now the operational 
advantages are overwhelming. 
 
Public policies encouraging 
domestic industry protection, 
or use of tariffs to change 
behavior, need to consider the 
magnitude of the operational 
costs.  
 
US Tariffs on one country may 
drive supply chains to source 
from another, but not back to 
the United States. 
2 lar, foreign trade was 11% of GDP in 1970, 
but was 28% in 2018.2 The question before 
us now is the future: Has COVID-19 tipped 
some balance? Will the economic interde-
pendence of nations be reversed? 
My answer: No.  
The purpose of this article is to illuminate 
some of the fundamental operational causes 
of the recent burst in international trade. 
These basic causes show that we are on a 
train headed in one direction. Possible polit-
ical decisions (e.g., tariffs, treaty withdraw-
als, declaring nationally protected indus-
tries) need to be considered with business 
realities in mind, or they will either backfire 
or fail.  
To demonstrate how the transition from na-
tional/regional economies to a global econo-
my took place, first let us look at interna-
tional wage rates. Then we will chart the 
changes that have taken place in cutting in-
ternational transportation costs for goods 
and the near elimination of cost in getting 
electronic service done internationally.  
DIFFERENTIAL WAGE RATES ACROSS 
NATIONS  
There are alluring non-wage reasons for in-
ternational trade: Brazil has a shortage of 
reindeer meat, and the coffee grown in Nor-
way has limitations. But, the simplest reason 
is to exploit wage differentials. Consider the 
comparative minimum hourly wages in the 
selected countries shown in Table 1. 
In the early 1990s, T-shirts for sale in the 
United States were made in Tennessee. Pro-
duction moved to low cost Western Hemi-
sphere locations in the mid-1990’s (e.g., 
Honduras). In 2020, they are made in Bang-
ladesh. Bangladesh now exports $37 billion/
year in apparel.3 Adding an 100% T-shirt 
tariff would double the cost for consumers, 
but still be equivalent to only a $0.72/hour 
labor cost in Bangladesh. The industry start-
ed from zero in Bangladesh in the late 
1970s.4 Why did it grow from nothing to $37 
billion in such a short time? We’ll get to that. 
In information intensive services, US back-
office work moved to Ireland and the Carib-
bean (note the wages in Barbados) in the 
1990s to 2000s. Physical documents were 
loaded onto ships and sailed there to be pro-
cessed. Now those services are provided by 
India, and transportation is over the web.  
Table 1 shows legal minimum wages. But, in 
many export categories, workers around the 
world are paid far less. The World Bank esti-
mates 100 million people worldwide are 
paid for piece-work often at one-half or one-
quarter minimum wage.5  
Wage differentials between countries have 
existed since the dawn of trade. For the past 
millennium, transportation and logistics 
costs were so high that they prevented ac-
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Table 1: Differential Wage Rates 
Source: WageIndicator.org (2019)  
Selected Countries 
Minimum Wage 
Per Hour 
Bangladesh (higher for 
garment workers) 
$ 0.09  
($ 0.36) 
Barbados $ 3.13  
China $ 0.85 
Honduras $ 1.08  
India $ 0.31 
USA $ 7.25 
cess to differential labor rates for nearly all 
industries. We divide the discussion as to 
why that was, and why it is no longer so, be-
tween the making of goods and the provi-
sion of services  
THE RISE OF THE CONTAINER SHIP  
By volume 90% of the world’s manufactured 
products travel by ship. In recent years ship-
ping costs have radically declined. In 1959, 
25% of the cost of many products were ac-
counted for by shipping.6 But now, transpor-
tation costs have become almost trivial for 
some products. Space in a trans-Atlantic 
ship can be had for $40/ton.  
The concept of “containerization” complete-
ly altered the economics of trade in goods. 
Prior to shipping goods in cargo containers, 
longshoreman with strong backs manually 
stacked and shifted small quantities of goods 
on ships. When unloaded from a ship, the 
cargo had to be re-transformed for inter-
modal travel by rail or truck. Widespread 
containerization has only taken place since 
1990. The operating cost of a containership 
only doubles as the ship volume triples, so 
bigger is cheaper, and ships keep getting 
bigger. The largest container ships can each 
carry 21,000 TEUs (Twenty Foot Equivalent 
Units, the standard measure of a container). 
There are roughly 170 such ships in the 
world. In 1968 world-wide capacity was on-
ly 50,000 TEUs. In 1990, the 20 largest con-
tainer ports in the world handled 31 million 
TEUs combined. The total in 2003: 144 mil-
lion. In the “old days” of the 1980s, the load-
ing/unloading process of a large merchant 
ship could take weeks. Cranes can now un-
load ships in less than a day.  
THE COST OF PROVIDING ELECTRONI-
CALLY TRANSMITTED SERVICES  
Many services are protected from interna-
tional competition due to the need for cus-
tomer contact—but that list was larger in 
1990. Now, suddenly, some services are 
“electronically transmissible” that never 
were before: reading an X-ray, handwritten 
receipts for tax preparation—the list is end-
less. From 1990 to now, the costs associated 
with electronic transmission of voice and 
documents went through the floor. 
The world-wide capacity for international 
service provision was previously limited by 
the communications equipment capacity. In 
the mid-1960s, it was only possible to have 
128 simultaneous calls between North 
America and Asia.7 Fiber-optic cable carries 
modern communications. In 1992, there was 
one GBPS (gigabyte per second) of cable ca-
pacity at the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean. 
By 1996, there were 11 GBPS. In 2014, there 
was 16,000 GBPS in the Atlantic and 14,000 
GBPS of capacity in the Pacific.8 A US-Europe 
telephone call cost $1/minute in 1990. Now 
a zoom conference is free.  
As a consequence of this thousand-fold in-
crease in capacity, US tax returns are now 
completed in India, New York City traffic 
tickets are entered into computer systems in 
The “friction” in trade—
logistics costs—has 
drastically lowered fairly 
recently, changing the world 
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Ghana, and radiologists residing in Israel 
take the night shift (day for them) at Iowa 
hospitals.  
WHICH WAY IN THE FUTURE?  
The point is that the “friction” in trade—
logistics costs—has drastically lowered fair-
ly recently, changing the world. It cannot go 
backwards. Politics can cause tariffs to rise, 
but containerized ships and the internet will 
not go away. A US tariff on China will drive 
supply chains to source in Vietnam, or per-
haps Africa, but not back to the United 
States.  
The costs of international trade are destined 
to decrease further. New ports being built all 
handle containerized traffic. Intermodal 
technology continues to drive down costs of 
delivering goods from the boat to the store. 
In the provision of services, 5G cell service 
and the continuing improvement in compu-
ting power will just enlarge the amount of 
services that can be rendered international-
ly. COVID-19 is getting us used to telemedi-
cine. When “seeing” a doctor on a computer 
screen, why bother with a US physician who 
makes $200,000/year and can see you in a 
month when an Indian doctor making $6,000/
year can see you today?  
4 
R
ic
h
ar
d
 M
ett
er
s 
| 
C
O
V
ID
-1
9
 N
o
 M
at
ch
 f
o
r 
th
e 
Fo
rc
es
 o
f 
G
lo
b
al
 T
ra
d
e 
| 
V
o
lu
m
e 
1
1
 |
 Is
su
e 
6
 |
 M
ay
 2
0
2
0
 
ABOUT THE MOSBACHER INSTITUTE 
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To share your thoughts 
on The Takeaway, 
please visit  
http://bit.ly/1ABajdH  
Richard Metters is professor and head of the 
Information and Operations Management 
Department at Mays Business School at Texas 
A&M University and serves as a Mosbacher 
Research Fellow. His research interests focus on 
service sector operations management and 
supply chain management.  
 
Notes: 
1 Ricardo, D. (1817). On the principles of political economy and 
taxation. London: John Murray, Albermarle-Street. 
2 The World Bank. (2020). https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS  
3 Staff correspondent (2019, June 30). Bangladesh to set apparel export 
target at $37.42 billion for FY20. Textile Today. https://
www.textiletoday.com.bd/bangladesh-set-apparel-export-target-37-42-billion-fy20/  
4 US Commercial Service, US Department of Commerce. (2018, 
December 10). Bangladesh - Garment and textile machinery and 
equipment. https://www.export.gov/apex/article2?id=Bangladesh-Textiles-and-
Textile-Machinery-and-Equipment  
5 The World Bank. (2011). World Development Report 2012: Gender 
equality and development. http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4391 
6 Levinson, M. (2006). The box: How the shipping container made the 
world smaller and the world economy bigger. Princeton University 
Press.  
7 Submarine Cable Networks, 2019. https://www.submarinenetworks.com  
8 Visual Capitalist. (2017). https://www.visualcapitalist.com/wp-content/
uploads/2017/08/submarine-cables-full.html.  
